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METASOCIOLOGY OF INTUITIONAL INTELLIGENCE

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CHAPTER I

*In search of a philosophical foundation for an
Integral Sociology*

THE HEART OF ANY scientific discipline is a consistent system of concepts, principles and theories.

The open and clandestine opposition by the majority of modern sociologists against almost all speculative sociology vituperating against it by calling it "armchair" sociology, aims uniquely at constructing "a natural science sociology" as a sham replica of the physical sciences.

This attitude is justly criticised by *Pitirim Sorokin*, when he says: "As to the revolt against 'armchair philosophy' is sociology, here again a sociologist can reject a specific brand of philosophy as a wrong philosophy but no sociologist can dismiss philosophy qua philosophy from sociology and sociological research. The very nature of psychological, cultural and value-problems cannot be properly defined and analyzed without some philosophical-epistemological, *ontological* and phenomeno-logical presuppositions. Of these philosophical premises three presuppositions are particularly unavoidable. Clearly or vaguely, convertly or overtly, in one way or another, they are assumed, and function in any research of any sociologist: 1, *the true nature of reality*; 2, *the true nature of man, society and culture*; 3, *What are the adequate ways, methods and techniques of their cognition?* Especially unavoidable are these 'armchair' presuppositions in investigation of basic problems of sociology".¹

¹ C. PITIRIM A. SOROKIN: "A quest for an Integral System of Sociology", México, D. F. 1961, p. 14 (Reprint from *Mémoire du XIXe Congrès International de Sociologie*", vol. III, México, D. F. 1961), italics are the authors.

This essay is not written for "philosophers, children and other more or less semantically deranged persons", as George Lundberg² assumed himself entitled to judge so widely differing subjects. One can not agree with his additional judgement that "philosophies may themselves be considered sociologically as systems of verbal behaviour"³ or that science is simply "a thechnic of adjustment."⁴

The primary concern here is not for one of the outstanding phenomena of modern sociology, namely to develop scales for quantitative expression or qualitative differences in social life. Every effort to construct a quantitative system for the social sciences is doomed in advance to fall short of expectations, since it impinges upon the vital laws of social life. Nevertheless, the remnants of quantomania and philosophical or juridical positivism in modern sociology, and related sciences, must be exposed. The disastrous influence of an ubiquitous Kelsenism with its oudenological metaphysics underlying surreptiously today's social sciences must be squarely faced.⁵

Most of our "scientific" sociologists seem quite unaware that they live in an outstanding atmosphere of sham-scientific slang that appears to cover up a rare degree of shallowness of thought.

It ought to be remembered that many of the magic catchwords which the modern sociologists are so fond of using, as for example "projective and psychological tests", "operational methods" and "psycho-analytical proceedings" etc., are mostly due to the illusion of a sort of *scientific fideism* which makes them embrace, it would seem, the creed of different denominations of the same *Freudian Cult* they blindly worship.

Pitirim Sorokin who did not shun to do away thoroughly with all the high-brow shibboleths that mask modern testomania and quantophrenia, and the obsolescent philosophies underlying them, proved himself to be a deeper thinker than most of the critics of Freudianism by correctly declaring the doctrine of sexual omnivalence and the Unconscious-Gospel to be unacceptable: "Most

² Cf. GEORGE LUNDBERG, "Foundations of Sociology", New York (Macmillan) 1939, p. 62.

³ Cf. *ib.* p. 29.

⁴ Cf. *ib.* p. 5.

⁵ Cf. IVO HOLLHUBER, "L'Etat comme concept sociologique" (Proceedings of the XIVth International Congress of Sociology, Rome 1950), *the same* "Vers une Revision des Grandes Notions Sociologiques: les Rapports du Droit et de la Sociologie" (Proceedings of the XVIIIth International Congress of Sociology, Nuremberg 1958), and *the same*, "Revalorización de la Filosofía y Jurisprudencia amenazadas de desquiciamiento en sus conceptos básicos". ("Humanitas", University of Nuevo León, México, 1961).

of its devotees adhere to the Freudian conception of the unconscious. This concept of personality structure is grossly defective. It puts into one unconscious class two entirely different orders of mental phenomena: the unconscious that lies below the level of the conscious, and the supraconscious, that lies above the class of the conscious mentality. The supraconscious is the highest creative and cognitive class of mental phenomena. It is the source of all the greatest creative achievements of genius. The unconscious is the lowest stratum of mental phenomena common to all species endowed with instincts and reflexes."⁶ Pitirim Sorokin was moreover ingenious enough to draw the consequences from the insight into the ambiguity of the Unconscious, i.e. of the insight into the supremacy of the intuitional intelligence (derived from *intus legere*:) above the rational reason: "The supersensory and super-rational intuition is the very opposite of the unconscious with which it is regularly confused. While the supersensory intuition is above the rational, conscious level of mentality, the unconscious or subconscious is below this level. Whilst any cognition, discovery, or creative achievement is always done consciously or superconsciously, the unconscious, by definition and by fact, cannot consciously discover or create anything other than the instinctively automatic. The all too familiar identification of the superconscious is a gross blunder, no matter how often and by whom it is done."⁷

It is therefore of utmost importance to state that the superrational intuition far from giving way to subjectivism and relativism, is on the contrary paving the way to what an outstanding contemporary philosopher Michele Federico Sciacca, calls "*Objective Interiority*."⁸

Thus we are faced with the problem of a non-rational knowledge which is the foundation of all rational knowledge, that is, of all propositions and of all concepts. This very same problem escaped almost all post-Kantian thinkers, except it would appear Antonio Rosmini. This widely misunderstood philosopher of Rovereto (1797-1855) has been falsely accused of plain ontologism, though he fought only undauntedly for the primacy of ontology over gnoseology in his time.

There is yet another fact we most consider. Intelligence in itself, that is

⁶ Cf. PITIRIM A. SOROKIN, "Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences", Chicago 1956, p. 84. and Luigi Stefanini, "Personalismo Sociale", Rome (Studium) 1952, p. 105 ss: "Il Freudismo quale marxismo psicologico".

⁷ Cf. PITIRIM SOROKIN, *ib.*, p. 284.

⁸ Cf. MICHELE FEDERICO SCIACCA, "L'Interiorite Objective", Milan (Bocca) 1952 and *the same*, "Acte et Etre", Paris (Aubier) 1958 and IVO HOLLHUBER, "Michele Federico Sciacca als Wegweiser Abendlandischen Geistes", Meisenheim-Glan (Main), 1962.

intelligence intuitively reading from inside (*intus legere*;) is intrinsically *theistic*. Reason is naturally immanent, whereas intelligence is naturally transcendent and theistic. Intelligence (always understood in the sense of *intus legere*) is the intuition of the idea of *esse*, i.e. of the first truth. There exists nothing, not even the contents of the natural and human world which could equal the idea of *esse* or the form of all knowledge. Consequently, the intelligence which comprehends the *esse* by intuition does not find its adequacy in any real contents. The idea of *esse* falls short of its real subsistence and remains always in search of its contents. This idea of *esse* excludes by its own nature all adequation. Intelligence means, therefore, transcendence and a theistic one at that. To have the intuition of the idea of *esse* does however not mean comprehending the *esse* by intuition nor understanding it by intuition. Man does not comprehend the *esse* whose idea he only grasps, and is, consequently, always only pushed onward to comprehend the Being in itself. Human understanding comprehends all things by the idea of *esse*, ignoring, nevertheless, the real Being that is proportionated to the idea. Man always aspires to know it, that is, he longs for the gift of its adequate object. Therefore to think, even unconsciously, means, in that sense, always to think the Absolute (God). (Cf. M. F. Sciacca 1. c.)

Kant's critique did not reach as far, because its real object was not the metaphysics, but the physics of his time. Kant supposed dogmatically that metaphysics could only be a science of the type of mathematics or physics, and identified human knowledge with mathematical and physical knowledge.

The idealistic illusion corresponds to the realistic illusion: both points of view have a common origin though they turned out to be inimical brethren of two *idola theatri* they have in common, that is, the identification of reality with the *esse* in itself and the conviction that *esse* and *cogitare* must oppose each other.

Selfconsciousness is the first specification of the original intuition of *esse* and precisely, therefore, is it the conscience of the ontological synthesis that constitutes the thinking *esse* which is a synthesis of the fundamental feeling and the fundamental intuition of the *esse*. Things do not produce autoconscience, but merely specify it. Autoconscience, as conscience of itself, is finite, because it is the "I am" or the conscience which the subject has of himself in the light of thought. Objective Interiority, on the contrary, is infinite, because it is the infinite possibility to think and to comprehend. Autoconscience, as the first actuality of the Objective Interiority does not make up the whole Objective Interiority which is neither equalled nor exhausted by it, although it is actualized in it.

Occidental thought has perhaps never undergone such a radical disintegra-

tion as is the case in our days. Never were man and things violated and annihilated in such a refined way with the help of a logic which ends in a void and which manipulates with mere formulae and signs. Psychology without a soul, morals without law and without objective values, jurisprudence without norms, all help to make total and radical the destruction of the human and natural universe by "dis-metaphysicalizing" the scientific language and by "physicalizing" the metaphysical language. Neo-positivism does its best to make the language of physics the mother tongue and the unique language of science itself. Man himself is annihilated and voided. God, liberty, immortality, soul, justice, etc., are out of his thought and declared to be mere words lacking any sense. Nothing remains but the "grammatical rules" of Carnap, the "physical language" of Neurath and the "conduct" of Watson. (Sciacca) Physicism is the very death of humanism in the same way as Marxist materialism and atheistic existentialism are its death. The pragmatism of Dewey does not appear to differ from the fundamental theses of Marx and Marxism, but rather makes up the "American form" of the latter. The void left by neo-positivists becomes filled with the "ideals" of Marxism. Michele Federico Sciacca commented on all this in a succinct treatise. It deserves to be read, because the intellectual world is becoming myopic to such a high degree that it condemns thereby unwittingly science to a harakiri by legalizing its "dis-ontologization."⁹

Fully justified Sorokin repudiated at the XIXth International Congress of Sociology¹⁰ in the same way those sociologists "who are unaware of their philosophical premises or who openly declare themselves free from any philosophy." He added, that these "anti-philosophical philosophers" merely replicate Molière's personage who talking prose was unaware that he was talking prose. In the same paper *Pitirim Sorokin* with utter clairvoyance scooped modern scientists of the inadequacy of their philosophical background and particularly of their defective, and at least, much too narrow conception of the true and total reality, as well as of the true nature of man and his super-organic reality.

On the other hand the need of filling this void in modern times is met with many attempts by younger scholars. Let us mention for example Agustín Basave Fernández del Valle who in his "Theory of the State"¹¹ did not

⁹ Cf. MICHELE FEDERICO SCIACCA, "The problem of Science" in "La Filosofia, oggi", Milan 1958, II vol. p. 173-277.

¹⁰ Cf. Proceedings, vol. III, México, D. F., 1961.

¹¹ DR. AGUSTÍN BASAVE FERNÁNDEZ DEL VALLE, *Teoría del Estado (Fundamentos de Filosofía Política)*, Editorial Jus, México 1955. A. German translation, "Allgemeine Staatslehre" With an introduction by the author of this essay is in prospect.

shrink from dedicating the first third of his book to a sound philosophical anthropology and philosophical founding of sociology.

Sorokin holds in his intrepid and courageous fight against contemporary quanto-frenetic pseudo-scientists that three main consistent answers have been given by humanity to the question "What is the nature of the true ultimate reality value?"

"One is: 'The ultimate, true reality-value is *sensory*. Beyond it there is no other reality nor any other non-sensory value.' Such a major premise and the gigantic supersystem built upon is called *Sensate*.

Another solution to this problem is: 'The ultimate, true reality-value is a supersensory and superrational God (Brahma, and other equivalents of God.) Sensory and any other reality or value are either a mirage or represent an infinitely more inferior and shadow pseudo-reality and pseudo-value.' Such a major premise and the corresponding cultural system are called *Ideational*.

The third answer to the ultimate question is: 'The ultimate, true reality-value is the Manifold Infinity which contains all differentiations and which is infinite qualitatively and quantitatively. The finite human mind cannot grasp it or define it or describe it adequately. This Manifold Infinity is ineffable and unutterable. Only by a very remote approximation can we discern three main aspects in It: the rational or logical, the sensory, and the superrational-supersensory. All three of these aspects harmoniously united in It are real; real also are its superrational-supersensory, rational, and sensory values.' It has many names: God, Tao, Nirvana, the Divine Nothing of mystics, the Supra-Essence of Dionysius and Northrop's 'undifferentiated aesthetic continuum.' *This typically mystic conception of the ultimate, true reality and value and the supersystem built upon are described as I n t e g r a l.*" (Author's italics)¹²

In another pamphlet of his¹³ Sorokin holds two "basic trends of our time" to be a continued disintegration of the hitherto dominant Sensate man, culture, society and system of values, and the emergence of slow growth of the first components of a new Integral dominant order, system of values, and type of personality.

Whereas the *Sensate Culture* was based upon the ultimate principle that the true reality and value are sensory and that beyond what we can see, hear, smell, touch and perceive with our senses there is no other reality and there

¹² Cf. PITIRIM SOROKIN, "A Quest for an Integral System of Sociology" 1. c., p. 26-27.

¹³ Cf. PITIRIM SOROKIN, "Three Basic Trends of Our Time" (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto "Balmes" de Sociología), Madrid 1961.

are no real values, and whereas the *Ideational Culture* was based upon the contrary ultimate principle that the true reality and value is the superrational God and His Kingdom, the *Integral Culture*, as interpreted by Sorokin, proclaims as its ultimate principle, "that the true reality-value is an Infinite Manifold which has supersensory, rational and sensory forms inseparable from one another."¹⁴

According to the Integral Theory of Cognition and Creativity, embraced by Sorokin, we have not one, but at least three different channels of cognition: sensory, rational, and supersensory-superrational.

It is the role of the true supersensory-superrational "intuition", the role of the Superconscious, which interests most in this connection.

Whereas the superconscious has been mixed up by all sensualistic philosophies with the unconscious or simply subconscious, the real nature of what is meant by the superconscious emerged like a flash suddenly in those moments, when humanity's great geniuses testified that they discovered and created their masterpieces by a sort of grace, a sudden enlightenment, a deep intuition which they did not in the least foresee or voluntarily produce themselves, and not by a logical, mathematical or syllogistical reasoning. It was the moment, when humanity's great mystics were granted the grace to grasp the mysteries of God and Nature in an *ictu trepidantis aspectus*.

Nevertheless Sorokin's outline is only partially acceptable. Questionable and quiet unjustifiable appears e.g. his seeming tolerance towards atheism, when he declares that "true religion is tolerant towards all other religions, including even atheism",¹⁵ and when holding, that "even agnosticism and atheism" are equally "a genuine manifestation of the Infinite" as Christianity has shown to be.¹⁶

Moreover, as will be shown, *Ideational* and *Integral Culture* overlap. The *Ideational culture* has in itself plenty of features which forecast an integration underlying them, whilst the *Integral Culture* is in itself bound to culminate in ideational intuition.

¹⁴ Cf. *ib.*, p. 9.

¹⁵ Cf. PITIRIM SOROKIN, *S. O. S., The Meaning of Our Crisis*, Boston, 1951, p. 122.

¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 114; the full passage reads as follows: "Thus Christianity is certainly a genuine manifestation of the Infinite in this Empirical world; so also are Taoism and Confucianism, Judaism and Hinduism, Buddhism and Moahmmedanism, even agnosticism and atheism".

Don Quijote and Sancho represent two partial aspects of man which integrate each other in man.

St. John of the Cross declared his whole "oficio" to consist in loving ("en amar"). Don Quijote, symbol of all of manking, exclaimed: "y es mi oficio y ejercicio andar por el mundo enderezando entuertos y desfaciendo agravios", (Par. I, chapt 19) ("and my office and occupation consists in walking through the world, setting right what is crooked and indemnifying what has been offended.")

Ivan Turguenev once asked "what does Don Quijote represent for himself?" and gave the striking answer, "he esteems his proper life only in the measure that it can serve as a means to realise his ideal which consist in planting truth and justice on earth." The splendid "madness" of Don Quijote did not remain without results. It helped in "donquijotizing" the "Sancho-Pansastic" society. The disdain of the immediate success helped to dethrone the macchiavellistic politics of "expediency", so common in our days.

The ontological defencelessness in his toiling to reach honour and immortality on the one hand, and his hunger for subsistential plenitude on the other, made Don Quijote offer his life as a metavital gift in order to realise the values of truth, goodness and beauty, and let him appear as an existential counterpoint, as A. Basave Fdez. del Valle has put it.¹⁷

Russian and Spanish authors called special attention to the character of renunciation that embodies the death of Don Quijote. "When in the end he renounced all," said Dostojewskij, "delivering himself from his madness and transforming himself in a reasonable person . . . he did not linger to leave that world quietly and with a sad smile on his lips." *Miguel de Unamuno* expressed a similar idea saying, "on the summit of thy passion, covered with sneers, thou renounces not thouself, but something greater than thou: thy work. (renuncias, no a tí mismo, sino a algo más grande que tú: a tu obra). And the glory receives the forever."

¹⁷ Cf. AGUSTÍN BASAVE FERNÁNDEZ DEL VALLE, "Filosofía del Quijote", México 1959, p. 37 ss and passim, and Ivo Hollhuber, "Cervantes und das Problem des Donquijotismus" in *Geschichte der Philosophie in spanischer Kulturbereich*, 1967, pp. 80-94, and MICHELE FEDERICO SCIAGGA, "Il Chiscottismo Tragico di Unamuno", Milán (Ed. Marzorati) 1971.

In a similar way the mystic, in the most intimate union with the Absolute (God), renounces himself and, beyond it, renounces his work.

What does all this mean?

To drive home to everybody the close parallel between the superrational intuitionists, champions of an integral culture, genuine mystics and the way how their adepts were set in the pillory by the representatives of a narrow-minded sensate culture and a quanto-phrenetic, "expediency" —bound society on the one side, and the ideals Don Quijote fought for and the way he was sneered at and declared made by his mentally inferiors on the other side. It is necessary to remember the true nature of reality and the true nature of man, inserted as man is in his culture and society; last but not least, it is necessary to learn how to win the day at Waterloo, like Don Quijote won it, in a higher sense, in spite of his "defeats."

A) *The true nature of Reality*

1) Strictly speaking, empiricism and the gigantic supersystem built upon it in the 19th and early 20th centuries, has become nowadays, untenable. "Empiricism, though it persists, is a relic of the past without scientific basis, and has itself proved to be, in this age of evolution, relativity and quanta, an outworn and outmoded superstition," as *Errol Harris* has put it sagaciously.¹⁸ What counts doubly, is the fact, that this knowledge dawned not only in the heads of theologians and metaphysicists, but in the most prosaic minds of many a world-renowned physicist who declared himself unable to solve the problem of matter, materialistically. Relativity has combined space and time into a single continuum which, however, does not extend indefinitely in opposite directions, but curves in upon itself and closes up and is therefore finite in extent. The waves represent only probabilities and there are no waves of any material sort at all in nature, but only in the physico-mathematical calculations of the scientists. Matter itself, as the last remnant of classical mechanics, has been resolved into waves and the waves into mathematical formulaes. Thus modern micro-physicists have out-heroded Herod! The chief reason for the collapse of empiricism however was its assumption that the world is made up entirely of particular things and the neglect of the universal element in experience and the dogmatic belief that sensations alone supply the whole furniture of human mind. Now, on the contrary, even what was hitherto

¹⁸ Cf. ERROL E. HARRIS, "Nature, Mind and Modern Science", London-New York, 1954, p. 452.

thought of as matter, turned out to be something beyond the reach of physics. The sensate answer to the problem proved to be entirely false.

2) The representatives of the philosophical systems which go by the name of transcendental or objective idealism endeavoured to make a contrariwise answer plausible by asserting that the objects must conform to our thought rather than that our thought should conform to the objects and the endless conflict between "Realism" and "Idealism" sprang into being and the autonomy of metaphysics seemed to be done for, at least for centuries.

Kant's "Copernican" revolution was indeed radical, but not radical enough, in so far as it embraced a dangerous dogma surreptitiously underlying his whole philosophy, namely, the unfounded assumption that metaphysics can be a science only in the same way as mathematics or physics can, and by adopting the very same methods of verification as do the sciences. This has led to any identification of human knowledge as a whole with mathematico-physical knowledge, to which alone objective truth is awarded. Therefore, no rational demonstration of God's existence, on these unproved premises, was any more possible. Yet, on closer view, the "Critique of the Pure Reason" offered nothing but a methodology of sciences employing dogmatically the "scientific reason" as "metaphysical reason" and, by doing so, made impossible any metaphysics, limiting their object to physics. On these premises there was no possibility in avoiding religious agnosticism. Kant looked in vain for a concept of God resulting from a sensible experience analogous to a mathematico-physical concept. He knew only a conception of experience limited to the sensible domain and ignored the interior experience which offers a knowledge even deeper and more true than that gained by the "Phenomena."¹⁹

In his critique of the classical metaphysics Kant fell back in the very same error which he himself had criticized, the error of the mathematical-scientific metaphysics of the modern rationalism.

The modern rationalism contains a fact M. F. Sciacca laid the stress upon since its beginning with Descartes an element of absurdity: namely to concede rationality and truth of thinking even if God would not exist, which is contradictory.

In conformity with Kant, God is only thinkable, which does not exclude the other hypothesis "God does not exist" as equally possible and conceivable: otherwise the antinomies or "conflicts" of the Pure Reason would not be possible.

¹⁹ Cf. To this whole passage: MICHELE FEDERICO SCIACCA, "L'interiorité Objective", Milan 1952, p. 77 ss. and IVO HOLLHUBER.

Now that it is inconceivable that God does not exist, by the very same reason are inconceivable and unthinkable the series of the antithesis. And the antinomy of the Pure Reason has come to an end.

If the hypothesis "God does not exist" lacks of sense and is not thinkable, the series of the antinomies which are founded on the validity of that hypothesis, results equally unthinkable.

Thus the "Antinomies of the Pure Reason" cease being compatible with the order of reason; only the hypothesis of the existence of God and with it the series of "the theses" comes into force.

Now, one has to distinguish gnoseology (which is concerned with the origin and formation of conceptions) from metaphysics (which is concerned with the origin and profundity of the idea of esse.) It was the mistake of "idealism" from Kant to Hegel (falling short of what Plato, St. Augustine and the genuine idealists in the full sense of the term desired to have true) to identify the whole objective knowledge with the rational discursivity, eliminating the original and superior knowledge offered by the intuition of the idea which is not only the foundation of the discursive knowledge, but (by the act of synthesis with the thinking activity) forms one of the constitutive principles of the human subject.

As was already implied in Chapter I of the essay, the idealistic illusion corresponds to the realistic illusion in so far as both points of view have as their common origin the *idola theatri* of a dogmatical identification of reality with the esse in itself and the equally dogmatic supposition that esse and cogitare oppose each other.

Therefore we can agree with Pitirim Sorokin when he repudiates the Ideational Culture and the supersystem built upon it as he repudiated the 'Sensate Culture and system, as long as his critique applies to modern "idealism" opposed to the empiristic and sensate culture and its modern "realistic" supersystem. It applies perfectly well to the alleged pseudo-reality and pseudo-value of all that is inferior to the Absolute and applies equally to all surrogates and sham equivalents of God, but it does not apply to the genuine idealism on the line from Plato — St. Augustine — Rosmini and to the integral theistic supersystem built upon it.

The study of the different forms of mysticism strengthens the awareness that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the "pan-enhenism" and the Vedantin monism on the one side, and the normal type of Christian mystical experience on the other side, as well as between monism and theism in general.

Therefore we may state the "idealistic" supersystem (understood in the

modern sense of the term) was dominant as a reaction against the Sensate Culture and its supersystems and flourished, frequently in common or in turn with the opposed Sensate Culture, during the XVIIIth, XIXth and early XXth centuries, whereas the genuine (not the decadent) Medieval conception of life and its holistic and theocentric systems — inclusive of those professed by St. Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz²⁰ — might well be considered as part of an Integral Culture.

3) The answer to the problem what the ultimate, true reality value would be like, given by the Integral Culture and the supersystems built upon it, has as background an Integral Philosophy. We concede that —as P. Sorokin put it— the Infinite Manifold is partly sensory, partly rational and partly supersensory and superrational and that the conception of the ultimate true reality and value in its highest apprehensions is typically mystical, but with the reserve (regarding his tolerance toward atheism), that only the theistic form of philosophy and mysticism is capable of leading us to the highest intuition possible, whereas the atheistic agnosticism refuses to think to its consequent end, stopping the thought and the apprehension at the last but one reason (offered by the sciences,) without advancing to the ultimate reason (offered by the metaphysics) of esse.

We remember that the idea of esse excludes by its own nature all adequate finite object and that man comprehends all things by the idea of esse though without comprehending the Being in itself. Thus, man in his search for an adequate object which should fully correspond to the idea of esse, thinks always —even unconsciously— of the Absolute, i.e., he thinks of God in that case even unconsciously or rather superconsciously.

This essay's thesis is in line with St. Augustine —Rosmini— Sciacca: St. Augustine is often consigned to the scrap-heap; by a considerable part of modern pundits, yet to their proper damage; Antonio Rosmini —who re-discovered the radical intuition, i.e. the original ontological synthesis— is often widely misunderstood and falsely declared to be a more or less important ontologist whilst, Michele Federico Sciacca, who is acknowledged in all countries of the Romance tongue as one of the outstanding contemporary philoso-

²⁰ Cf. OTHMAR ANDERLE, "Die Ganzheitstheorie" in "Zeitschrift für Ganzheitsforschung", Vienna 1960, p. 14-15 and the same "Die Monadologie G. W. Leibniz", ibid., pp. 149-161, and IVO HOLLHUBER, "La Filosofia Illuminista come Madrina della Sociologia Moderna" (VI Convegno Internazionale Italo-Tedesco, Merano 1965, and the same: "Svolgimenti paradossali della Filosofia nel Seicento" (VII Convegno Internazionale Italo-Tedesco, Merano 1966).

phers, has so far remained rather unknown in the United States and in the English and German speaking areas of Europe.²¹

Thus the philosophy of Integralism which acknowledges different channels of cognition, such as sensory, rational, supersensory, super-rational and mystical, describes the true nature of reality as being manifold. Yet it ought not to be overlooked that other modern pioneers of an Integral Philosophy have sufficiently underlined the theotropical character of the Idea of esse, whose original intuition (as a primitive and ontological synthesis of the human intelligence and its object) is its Objective Interiority.

B) *The true nature of Man.*

Man nowadays has become the focus of philosophical, metaphysical, sociological and cultural interests. Yet the results of all the concentrated researches into man's intimate nature seem to have fallen short of the expectations placed in them. The problem, e.g. what a genuine humanism should be like, seem to make us run the risk of knowing always more and more about less and less.

In a paper presented to the XIth International Congress of Philosophy (Brussels 1953), we hinted at the ambiguity of a philosophical access to that problem equalizing philosophy with the "art to learn to be a man."²² There is a double antagonism between the two fundamental positions prevailing since the days of Protagoras up to the present day: 1) the autonomous man and 2) the theotropical man.

1) The conception of the *autonomous man*, however, can be a part of three quite different ideologies:

a) In a *Sensate Culture*: Due to the prologued influence of what in the history of Literature and Philosophy goes by the name of "Enlightenment" (Siecle des Lumieres, "Aufklärung,") is has become a matter of course to view man mainly as an animal organism whose nature best should be interpreted in a proper mechanistic, physicalistic and instinctivist way. Later on, the "physicalistic-biological" in terpretation of man's nature was completed and allegedly "improved" by the Freudians and by "depth-psychology." We already exposed the reasons why such an approach to the problem turns out to be a

²¹ Cf. IVO HOLLHUBER, "Michele Federico Sciacca ein Wegweiser Abendlaendischen Geistes", Meisenheim-Glan (A. Hain) 1962, and the same: "Geschichte der italienischer Philosophie..." 1969, pp. 44-67 (Antonio Rosmini) and pp. 326-349 (M. F. Sciacca).

²² Cf. IVO HOLLHUBER, "Philosopher c'est apprendre a etre homme" (Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy, Brussels 1953, vol. XIV, p. 7 ss.).

deadend in general, and why especially the Unconscious-Gospel is unacceptable and unfit to offer a plausible concept of man's personality.

In his famous study "Accident and Necessity"²³ Jacques Monod tried to prove man to have been a lucky hit of Nature, a "gipsy on the brink of the Universe." Whilst F. L. Boschke in an equally well renowned volume "The Origin of Life"²⁴ stated human life to have been the result of natural evolution as necessary as e.g. the formation of basalts.

b) In a mock *Ideational Culture*: At first we have in view all the partisans of the modern trends of pseudo-idealism from Kant to Hegel and his schools. What been said against their authors in the preceding section ("The true nature of Reality") is obviously valid here too. Every one-sided theory of the nature of man, which reduces man's whole being to mere sensual or mere rational processes, succumbs to the temptation of considering man as an *autonomus being*.

c) In a *Pseudo-Integral Culture*: With a presentiment of the impossibility to confine man's nature to a sensuous experience or to a rational-discursive thought, many an attempt has been made to open for man the door into the realm of the supra-conscious and to make him dream the dream of self-deification.

The study of the monistic forms of mysticism shows man identifying himself with the Absolute (the individual soul being substantially and essentially imagined as identical with the unqualifiable Brahman) and accepts as final state the isolation of his soul in a "natural rest", without the slightest hope to fill its fathomless abyss with the transcendent God who alone could really fill his soul.

The highest intuitions, the flashes of enlightenment, the unique inspirations, that made geniuses create their immortal works, remain hidden in a undifferentiated aesthetic continuum and in an ego-less sphere of an anonymous substratum.

2) The phenomenology of the *theotropical man* is equally manifold:

a) In the milieu of an apparently *Sensate Culture*: Strictly speaking, under this heading there figures no genuine sensate culture any more.

What, at first sight, seems to intensify the zoologification of the *Homo Sapiens*—the evolution that in some hundred millions of years reached the cerebralisation of man—on closer view turns out to be equally theotropical, for even the noo-sphere coextensively superimposed on the biosphere, is acknow-

²³ Cf. F. L. BOSCHKE, "Die herkunft des lebens" (Econ. Vulag) 1970.

²⁴ Cf. F. L. BOSCHKE, "Die herkunft des lebens" (Econ. Vulag) 1970.

ledged to have been directed as well in its expansive socialisation (civilisation and individualisation) as in its compressive socialisation (totalisation and personalisation) by a point Omega (God), who is the author and consolidator of such a stupendous evolution. These and similar lucubrations of *Teilhard de Chardin* appear too maundering for a generation made of too ragged a stuff, yet time may, in certain limits, prove his audacious perspectives to be however the most important and productive "science-fiction" of his time.²⁵ It is the discontinuous (be it the sudden initial boiling of heated water, be it the sudden psychic boiling of man's bodily evolution) that contrasts with the continuous, and forbids to consider man as only a higher developed ape, notwithstanding his "entrance in the world without any noise", and leaves plenty of room for a divine intervention in the midst of an aeonic evolution that has God as its motor and consolidator. It seems erroneous to imagine biology as being merely a sort of physics of the very complex, and noospheric brains as the organ of collective human reflexion, by reflecting the personalisation of man and his evident converging to Omega (God).²⁶

Let us, moreover, not forget *Portman's* warning that "the idea of derivation of the higher from the lower, leads astray"²⁷ nor *W. Schmidt's* and *W. Koppers* ethnological proofs of the original theism and monogamy of the primitive peoples.²⁸

b) In the milieu of genuine *Ideational Culture*: here we are again on the line of the genuine idealism upon which Plato, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Rosmini and others built their systems. The structure of this idealism is holistic and theotropical. Man's mind is not reduced to a mere rational thought, but embraces equally the fulness of spiritual life with its supersensory

²⁵ Whilst the theologian N. M. Wildiers (cf. the Preface to Teilhard de Chardin's "Le Phenomene Humain") and Henri de Lubac cf. "La pensee religieuse du Pere Teilhard de Chardin", Paris 1962) do not doubt about the Christian orthodoxy of the author, Philippe de la Trinite (cf. "Rome et Teilhard de Chardin", Paris 1964) and above all *Dietrich von Hildebrand* (cf. "Trojan Horse in the City of God", Chicago 1967) impute to P. Teilhard de Chardin to have deformed Christianity with a touch of naturalistic monism and even pantheism due to his evolutionary doctrine with neglect of the dignity proper to the human person.

²⁶ Cf. P. TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, "Le Phenomene Humain", Paris. (Ed. du Seuil), 1955, especially pp. 14, 15, 185, 186, 189, 203, 286 ss.

²⁷ Cf. A. PORTMAN, "Biologische Fragment su einer Lehre vom Menschen", Bale, 1949, p. 10.

²⁸ Cf. WILHELM SCHMIDT, "Der Ursprung de Gottesidee", 5 vol., Munster i.w., 1926, ss, and Wilhelm Koppers, "Der Urmensch und sein Weltbild", Vienna, 1949, p. 35, 90, 180 and passim.

and superrational flourishing of the highest creative energies all tending and concentrating towards their Maker.

Additional attention should be paid to the fact that a precipitated identification of man with the *animal rationale* may be misunderstood, though it was widely spread in the Thomistic culture and founded on a genuine and therefore integral idealism, which makes us class its great thinkers among the representatives of the integral and theotropical culture.

Man's mind is to be identified neither with reason, not with will, nor with sentiment etc., though reason, will and sentiment etc., are the forms of his spiritual activity. The human mind is the real and living unity of all the forms of the spiritual activity of man and therefore we propose another term which should take root in "intelligence", derived from *intus legere*. In that sense it seems more precise to call man the *animal spirituale* (Siacca) instead of *animal rationale*.

c) In the milieu of an equally Genuine Integral Culture: Onesidedness, narrowness and inadequacy is usually the reproach the pioneers of a new mock integral culture make to the representatives of the pretended obsolete theistic ideational culture. The deeper tendency underlying such reproaches may become man fast by an acuter sensibility to what goes by the name of *Humanism*.

Now, Humanism, is in itself ambiguous too, and may play quite a different part for the autonomous man and for the theotropical man. Humanism may be synonymous with atheism. In that sense *Jean Paul Sartre* embraced humanism and drew the last consequences out of his atheistic existentialism.²⁹ *Leopoldo Palacios*, on the contrary, condemned humanism as an anthropocentric movement which is practically atheistic because it puts the centre of man in man himself, wherefore every humanism seemed to him to be inhuman on account of its being anthropocentric and atheistic.³⁰ Thus Sartre embraced and Palacios repudiated humanism for the same reason, i.e. for having an atheistic character. Between these two contrary cultural poles lies a whole scale of differently tinged valuations of humanism. Perhaps *Jacques Maritain* takes a just middle position by accepting humanism as the equality of all men, the conquest of liberty, the respect of the human person in an

²⁹ Cf. JEAN PAUL SARTRE, "L'existentialisme est un humanisme", Paris (ed. Negel), 1958, p. 94: "L'existentialisme n'est pas autre chose qu'un effort pour tirer toutes les conséquences d'une position athée cohérente".

³⁰ Cf. LEOPOLDO PALACIOS, "El mito de la Nueva Cristiandad", Madrid 1952: "el humanismo es un movimiento antropocéntrico, prácticamente ateo que coloca el centro del hombre en el hombre mismo" (p. 59) "mejor sería pensar que todo humanismo es inhumano, que todo humanismo es antropocéntrico y ateo."

organic community and the expression of similar principles covered with an unequivocal theism.³¹

Taking into consideration these different opinions about humanism, we have no reason to be astonished that even a genuine idealistic and theistic culture runs that risk of being judged narrow, mindedly from a pseudo-integral point of view which casts suspicion on the theistic supersystem of an ideational culture supposing in it a sort of cultural lag that ought to be overridden by a more integral conception of the world.

There is, however, a very considerable difference between the spurious and the genuine conception of Humanism and Integration, comparable to that between the ontological theory of the Mandukya Upanishad and that of Ghazali: in the case of the Upanishad the initial dogma is "the Self is Brahman", that is to say that the individual soul is conceived as being actually identical with God, whereas the Muslim starts with the dogma that God alone is Absolute Being and that all things perish except His face. For the Muslim, man only exists at all in so far as he given existence by God; for the Hindu he is God and through God all things eternally.³² We must heed the consequences: "On the premises of the Mandukya Upanishad there can be no humility or sense of awe in the face of an Absolute Being who alone really exists and is distinct from man: there can be no sense of nullity or unworthiness. There can be unity but there can be neither union nor communion. Thus the Vedantin sees himself as the Absolute, one without a second, while the Muslim sees himself as he exists essentially apart from God as pure nothingness".³³

Well, does Integral Culture adopt the position of the Vedantin or of the Muslim? (We do not even refer to the Christian position, in order not to run the risk of being prejudiced). In the first case, the ideational culture and its theistic supersystem look like "narrow", but only at the price of consenting to the deification of man, i.e. at the price of his dishumanization. In the second case humility, understood as an ontological truth, opens all the doors to a wider space and leads man to always higher horizons and proves itself to be the sesame to the true integralization of man by drawing the last consequences from his ontological position.

³¹ Cf. JACQUES MARITAIN, "Principes d'une Politique Humaniste", Paris 1945, *passim* and IVO HOLLHUBER "La crisis dell'ipocrisia nell'umanesimo" (IX Convegno Internazionale Italo-Tedesco) Merano 1968.

³² Here we followed closely the exposition of this confrontation in R. C. ZAEHNER, "Mysticism Sacred and Profane", Oxford 1957, p. 158.

³³ Cf. R. C. Zaehner, l.c. p. 158-159.

But in that case, i. e. conceding the wellfoundedness of the theistic system of the genuine idealism, what does the genuine Integral Theory of culture add to all this, and why does it adopt the right of claiming a proper denomination?

It is, we dare say, the constant regard it pays to *man's metasociological background*. The term "metasociological" may be introduced to specify precisely the awareness of the constant ontological and metaphysical keynote of every social reality. Otherwise a sociology may fail to meet its aim on account of a defective and inadequate conception underlying its object.

It is consistent with an integral theory of culture to state the priority of society as whole to its members as to its particulars. Much confusion is due to the neglect of distinguishing between human *individual* and human *person*. Though we cannot give here a coherent social doctrine,³⁴ it may suffice to underline the necessity of awarding to the human *person* the ontological priority as to society, and to society the holistic priority as to *individuals*. The frequent violation of this simple hierarchical order caused innumerable misfortunes to man and society, and will do so in future.

C. How to win the day at Waterloo.

At the present time the propaganda for the would-be scientific doctrines of the materialistic, empiristic, quanto-maniac and libido-bound Sensate Culture has not yet come to an end. Its disastrous consequences force the individuals into a totalitarian despotism wielded by public opinion. Where faith declines, superstition augments. Sin as an offense of God is widely laughed at. Lacking modernity is rather reputed as the greatest sin. In vain genuine scientist, world-renowned physicists and sociologist declared empiricism and materialism to be an outworn and outmoded superstition. It is a well known fact that the popular philosophies which form the conceptions of life and the ideologies of the man in the street, are wont to display a cultural lag or limp at least some decades or even centuries behind the times. What wonder then that we see the philosophies of the "Enlightenment" and of "Materialism" bearing in that sense their late fruits in our days?

Now and then, though sporadic and isolated, some courageous pioneers rise and undauntedly shrink from nothing, in order to pave the way for the torch of man's intuitional intelligence that widens to mankind mental horizons of

³⁴ IVO HOLLHUBER: "Sprache-Gesellschaft - Mystik (Prolegomena zu einer pneuma-tischen Anthropologie)", Munich (E. Reinhardt) 1963.

unheard of grandiosity. Unable to refuse these intrepid champions, their impotent adversaries, quite envious, frequently give the watchword to hush them up.

That was, for example, the case in the past with *Antonio Rosmini* and not long ago with *Othmar Spann*,³⁵ the bold and intrepid Austrian sociologist who fought incessantly against individualism and mechanism, like a pioneer for an holistic methodology and ontology of the social sciences in Europe. In the United States *Pitirim Sorokin*, the outstanding herald of a new integral sociology will, as we hope, come better off in spite of his quanto-phrenetic adversaries that are holding yet influential chairs and knew how to win popularity by coaxing the senses and lulling the brains. We second this famous sociologist, taking exception only to his tolerance of atheism which we think to be the cancer not only of religious, but also of cultural life as a whole.³⁶

We drew a close parallel between the superrational intuitionists (may they belong to the number of scientists who, in a flash of superrational enlightenment, invented and created for centuries to come, or may we find them among the divinely inspired mystics who excelled in the ineffable union with their Maker) and the immortal Hidalgo of the Mancha. "Aún no ha empezado el reino de Don Quijote en España" (the realm of Don Quijote has not yet begun in Spain) once exclaimed Miguel de Unamuno. And we are tempted to add that the realm of the intuitional intelligence will never loom at the gloomy horizon of our age. On this earth all will obey the dictates of quanto-phrenetic and testomaniac pundits or, at best, be conformed to the guidance of the simple reasons. We are afraid, never to experience the "lonquijotizing" of our "sanchopansa-istic" society, we soon revishly were longing for.

³⁵ Cf. OTHMAR SPANN, "Gesellschaftslehre", 3 Ed. Leipsic, 1930, the same, "Gesellschaftsphilosophie" Munich 1928; the same, "Kämpfende Wissenschaft", ena 1934, the same, "Erkenne Dich selbst", Jena 1936, the same, "Ganzheitliche Logik", Salzburg Klosterneuburg (Stifterbibliothek), 1958. (Posthumous).

³⁶ By *Atheism* we do not mean a disbelief in the dogmas of any Christian denomination, nor do we mean by it the disbelief in any anthropomorphic deity, but the negation of a supreme and personal Being (whose personality is, as a matter of course only conceived as analogous to human personality) as the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem of the whole spiritual and material universe.

F. BACON once wrote (De dign. et aug. scient., 1 Io. I, par. 5) "Certissimum est, atque experientia comprobatum, leves gustus in philosophia movere fortasse in atheismum sed pleniores haustus ad religionem reducere" and VOLTAIRE, who really did not exceed in religious piety: "les athees sont pour la plupart des savants, que raisonnent mal" (Dict. phil., Paris, Flamarion, s. a., p. 45.).

MICHELE F. SIACCA, in a succinct paper (L'Ateismo in "Dio nella ricerca umana", Rome 1950, p. 569-617) gave an excellent commentary which classes the atheist with the "insipiens" even from the scientific and philosophic point of view; Cf. the same, "Filosofia e Metafisica", Milan 1962, vol. II, p. 149-150.

Man's concern is only to fight for the accession of Truth; to make it triumphant is not in his lines. Yet, there is a means of vanquishing fate: the art of becoming victorious in spite of apparent defeats. In his unique book "How to win the day at Waterloo"³⁷ M. F. Sciacca gave us some precious hints. It is the intimate value of our acts that counts, not the idolized expediency of them. It is moreover of the utmost importance to risk the jump in the practical, social and political life of today, and to utilize the forces, gained by intuitional intelligence, to the best of all in this present hour which seems to be so decisive in the world's universal predicament and plight.

Scientific literature abounds in pedestrian works of industrious mediocrity haunted by the eclecticism of many a would-be system, but which fall short of the paramount need we have of a genuine adequate conceptional system which turns to account for the integral ontological intuitions in favour of a better understanding of socio-cultural phenomena.

By "dis-metaphysicalizing" the scientific once again it must be brought home to our modern sham-philosophies: language and by "physicalizing" the metaphysical language, *Neo-positivism* does its best to make the language of physics the mothertongue and the unique language of science itself. Man himself is annihilated and voided. God, liberty, immortality, soul, justice, etc., are out of his thought and declared to be mere words lacking any sense. Nothing remains but the "grammatical rules" of Carnap the "physical language" Neurath and the "conduct" of Watson. Their lines run into a stubborn antimetaphysical idiosyncrasy: there are no eternal problems, because there are no philosophical problems at all. Those questions which are called philosophical have no sense, for philosophy is not a theory but an activity. Consequently, the sole task of the philosopher is to convince would-be philosophers that philosophical questions are not real questions, and those that claim to be philosophical propositions are meaningless "to prevent people", as professor Ayer put it, "from committing an intellectual nuisance".

The cogency of these arguments depends upon the assertion that the complete body of natural science exhausts the totally of true propositions; but that assertion is a dogma lacking justification and so is without claim to our credence.

In short, the basis of the assertion is a theory expressed in propositions that do not fall within the domain of science, a theory which would normally be called philosophical. It is, in fact, a metaphysical proposition and must stand or fall with metaphysics.

Moreover, language is held to be a matter of convention, and in the main of

³⁷ Cf. MICHELE F. SCIACCA, "Come si vince a Waterloo", Milan 1957.

arbitrary convention; so we arrive finally at the paradoxical conclusion that the results of deductive reasoning, proceeding by necessary logical steps depend ultimately upon arbitrary linguistic convention.

The world Wittgenstein tells us is everything that is the case, is the totality of facts, and can be analysed into atomic facts (Sachverhalte) which are mutually independent and each of which can either be or not be the case, without affecting any of the others. Consequently they cannot be inferred one from another.

We picture the facts to ourselves and the pictures are said to be models of reality. Such a logical picture, Wittgenstein says, is the thought of the fact pictured and he apparently equates thinking with imagining for he states in his Tractatus (3.001): "An atomic fact is thinkable" — means: we can imagine it".

The doctrine is self-destructive. It is itself a theory and does not belong to any natural sciences, a metaphysical theory standing in evidence against what it maintains. (Errol E. Harris).

The demand that we should compare the sense of the proposition with the fact, is itself nonsensical, for the sense of the proposition is the fact, as we picture it. We cannot compare the fact as we picture it with the fact as it is in itself.

The attainment of perceptual assurance is never simply a matter of sensing, but depends on the acquisition of a systematic body of evidence, it is consequently quite impossible to verify material object-propositions by reducing them to basic propositions as the positivist theory demands.

If hypothetical propositions are incapable of verification in the manner required, all empirical hypotheses are, following the nature of the case, ruled out of court.

Wittgenstein, himself seemed to be aware of the metaphysical character of his statements, though not of the consequences to which it ought have led him, for he admits that his propositions are senseless and exhorts us to throw away the ladder upon which we have climbed. (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 6.54) Which ladder? One that has never existed? If the propositions of the Tractatus are senseless, they provide no ladder upon which to climb.

Carnap who avoided committing himself explicitly to any metaphysical doctrine — rejecting Wittgenstein's philosophical nihilism but retaining his anti-metaphysical attitude — advocated the dogmatic assertion that only verifiable propositions have sense and then denied the possibility of verification to metaphysical propositions. He is involved in contradiction, equally with Wittgenstein, when rejecting the possibility of a philosophical theory of knowledge, but for

his own doctrine assumes one in its insistence on verifiability as the test of meaning and holds that truth resides in sense-perception, which alone provides evidence and by reference to which alone propositions can be verified.

Thus we must be on our guard against the deceptive sleight of hand by which translations into the formal mode can make real problems seem to disappear.

Professor Ayer whose doctrine shows the influence of *Hume* to so marked a degree that even a casual reader could hardly fail to notice it, adopts the position of Wittgenstein and Carnap that metaphysical propositions are unverifiable and therefore senseless and he describes *the history of philosophy* as a "parade of pontiffs" who attempt "to give a complete and definite account of ultimate reality, whereas the modern philosophers of his ilk are at pains to show that this ultimate reality is a fiction".

Thus "the problem of perception, the problem of knowledge of other minds, the question of significance of moral judgments and so on have been regarded as purely semantic". E. g. "a thing cannot be in two places at once" is not an empirical proposition, says Ayer, but is linguistic because "it simply records the fact that, as a result of certain verbal conventions, the proposition that two sense-contents occur in the same visual or tactical sensefield is comparable with the proposition that they belong to the same material thing".

We dwelled on purpose on these items, familiar to the philosophy of the so-called *Vienna Circle* and followed mainly the critique set forth by *Errol E. Harris*³⁸ in order to show that it is quite impossible to solve the problem of *Spirit, World and History from an anti-metaphysical point of view*.

If then we ask once more for a *metasociological background of modern integral Culture* — proposing the term "metasociological" to specify precisely the awareness of the constant ontological and metaphysical keynote of every social reality we have this first of all to put the problem of what the ultimate true reality-value is like.³⁹

It is therefore of utmost importance to state once again that the superrational intuition, far from giving way to subjectivism or relativism, is on the contrary paving the way towards what goes by the name — as we have been setting forth — of the "Objective Interiority" and acts as a paramount base to solve the concrete problems of the present day.

³⁸ Cf. ERROL E. HARRIS, "Nature, Mind and Modern Science", London and New York, first published in 1954.

³⁹ Cf. IVO HOLLHUBER, "The Metasociological Background of Modern Integral Culture" (Proceedings of the XIVth International Congress of Philosophy, Vienna 1968, Vol. VI., p. 293 ss.).

When commenting the great success of a recent book which *Michel Foucault* published — "Les mots et les choses" ("The words and the things"), Paris 1966 — *Jean Paul Sartre* put the stress upon the fact that *to repudiate history is a dominant tendency in the attitude of the young generation*; no wonder therefore that an author is applauded who holds man to be an invention whose recent date and perhaps near end the archeology of our thought easily exhibits.

We stick therefore to the contrary point of view, i. e. that *we have rather to concentrate our mind on history*.

In the entangled plight of the political situation of the present day, all of us — I dare say — must feel awakened to social and political responsibility. For not only the European Culture but the peace of the whole world is a stake.

Following the catchword of *Abraham Lincoln* "If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it" we regard it as a first duty to aim at a *necessary Revision of Contemporary History and to deal with the ideological causes of unrest in the world and not only with its symptoms on the social and political surface*.

In 1947 *James F. Byrnes* published his sagacious volume "*Speaking Frankly*" which opened the eyes to many a narrow-minded pundit of Roosevelt's clique that was digging, first imperceptibly but nevertheless efficiently, the grave of Europe. It is high time that another expert has the courage to "speak frankly" once again.

It seems that e. g. *Wilhelm Röpke* with his book "Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage" ("*Beyond supply and demand*") (4th ed. / Zurich-Stuttgart 1966), *James Burnham* with his "*Suicide of the West*" (New York 1964 and *Russel Kirk* with his volume "*The Conservative Mind*" (Chicago 1958) paved the way for a social self-examination of Western Culture: especially *Burnham's* statement that liberalism fosters the ideology of Western Suicide and *Röpke's* statement that the idolatry of an absolute mass-democracy, careless of the highest moral principles and of the natural law, is responsible of the social and cultural decline of the West, ought to be brought home to everybody who feels himself inspired with the goal of a just and world-wide peace.

The author of this pamphlet is about to publish two volumes in the same lines i. e. (*Questions Européennes*) *La pauvre Clio* and "*Der Todesschlaf Europas*".

For the time being, have already been published on similar subject: *Ivo Höllhuber*, "Vers une Revision des Grandes Notions Sociologiques: Les Rapports du Droit et de la Sociologie" (Actes du XVIIIe Congrès International de Sociologie) Nuremberg 1958.

the same, "Revalorización de la Filosofía y Jurisprudencia amenazadas de desquiciamiento en sus conceptos básicos" (University of Nuevo León/México). 1961.

the same: "Sprache-Gesellschaft-Mystik", Munich/Bale 1963.

the same: "En torno a las Ideologías Jurídico-Políticas-Filosóficas de la O.N.U. y de la U.N.E.S.C.O." (Anuario Humanitas/University of Nuevo León/México) 1967

the same: "El Eje Metahistórico del Porvenir Europeo" (Anuario Humanitas, University of Nuevo León/México) 1968.

the same: "La Coesistenza Tra Nazionalismo e Stato Universale" (III Congresso Internazionale degli Scrittori Cristiani: Coesistenza e Cultura), Venice 1969.

LA SOCIOLOGÍA POLÍTICA

POR EL DR. LUCIO MENDIETA Y NÚÑEZ

Presidente de la Asociación Mexicana de Sociología.

LA POLÍTICA ES UN fenómeno social muy antiguo; pero sólo cobra contornos precisos a partir de la organización de las sociedades humanas en unidades independientes sobre el haz de la tierra, bajo una autoridad que ejerce el Poder.

Organización social y Poder, son los dos presupuestos indispensables de la Política.

¿Pero qué es la Política? "La Política desde el punto de vista estático, según G. Burdeau, es la estructura que imponen a la sociedad las relaciones de autoridad y de obediencia establecidas en vista de un interés común. En su aspecto dinámico se refiere a todos los fenómenos implicados por la actividad que tiende a la conquista del Poder o a su ejercicio".¹

Esta definición es casi perfecta; pero la Política, en nuestro concepto, nunca es estática. Aun en el aspecto puramente administrativo del Gobierno, las estructuras estatales varían y aquél ejerce, por medio de la Administración Pública, actividad constante y la orienta de acuerdo con la ideología y los intereses partidistas que representa. En cuanto a la Política como acción para conquistar el Poder o influir sobre él, es, por naturaleza, esencialmente dinámica.

Para C. E. G. Contlin, es "una acción de control humano y social", concepto demasiado general que abarcaría inclusive las relaciones familiares privadas, siendo que la Política tiene un carácter eminentemente público.

Una definición menos académica se encuentra en el Diccionario de Sociología de Henry Pratt Farchild: "Teoría y Arte Práctico del Gobierno". Pero

¹ Ver: ALAIN BIROU. "Vocabulaire Pratique des Sciences Sociales. Editions Economie et Humanisme". Les Editions Ouvrières. París.