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La respuesta no deja lugar a dudas; el método prospectivo "no está en las cosas sino en el hombre. No es una ley del objeto, sino una regla para el sujeto". A una posible objeción en cuanto a una falta de objetividad, G. Berger opone la "exigencia subjetiva: se trata, para obrar mejor, de transformarnos a nosotros mismos".⁶⁴ Esta "ciencia de la práctica" (término tomado de M. Blondel) nos impone efectivamente al menos dos reglas de conducta: "una revisión permanente de nuestros objetivos y de nuestros problemas" en estrecho contacto con la "realidad concreta" y según las "experiencias verdaderas", y el no dejar sin clara solución el dilema de poder y libertad.

G. Berger se quedó fiel —podríamos decir con fidelidad dialéctica— al papel que asumió voluntariamente y con plena conciencia. Escogió el itinerario de su existencia y lo recorrió sin vacilar. "Entrar en la carrera filosófica" significó siempre para él "recusar una vez para siempre los argumentos de autoridad y decidir no ceder sino a la verdad de las razones o a la realidad de las experiencias".⁶⁵

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

⁶⁵ BERGER, G., *Hommage aux philosophes aixois*, en *Les Etudes Philosophiques*, 2, 1958, p. 116.

THE AMBIGUITY OF MYSTICISM

I V O H Ö L L H U B E R

(Dr. phil., Dr. jur., Dr. rer. pol., Mag. phil.)

To what extreme degree "popular science" adopted sham-conceptions of mysticism and offered at times quite a caricature of its most typical representatives appears obvious when consulting one of the most renowned encyclopaedias.

In the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (London 1955) we read under the heading "Mysticism" as follows:

"Mysticism, a phase of thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, which from its very nature is hardly susceptible of exact definition . . .

The thought that is most intensely present with the mystic is that of a supreme, all — pervading, and indwelling power, in whom all things are one. Hence the speculative utterances of mysticism are always more or less pantheistic in character. On the practical side, mysticism maintains the possibility of direct intercourse with this Being of beings — intercourse, not through any external media such as an historical revelation, oracles, answers to prayer and the like, but by a species of transfusion or identification, in which the individual becomes in very truth 'partaker of the divine nature'. God ceases to be an object to him, and becomes and experience . . . When a religion begins to ossify into a system of formulas and observances, those who protest in the name of a heart-religion are not unfrequently known by the name of mystics. At times they merely bring into prominence again the everfresh fact of personal religious experience; at other times mysticism develops itself as a powerful solvent of definite dogmas."

The *Encyclopaedia* article confirms:

(Ed. 1955): "In St. Theresa (1515-1582) and John of the Cross (1542-1591) the counterreformation can boast of saints second to none

in the calendar for austerity of mortifications and the rapture of the visions to which they were admitted. But, as was to be expected, their mysticism moves in that comparatively narrow round, and consists simply in the heaping up of these sensuous experiences. The speculative character has entirely faded out of it, or rather has been crushed out by the reins of discipline.

(Ed. 1955 and Ed. 1964): "The shock threw her (St. Theresa) into a trance, and these trances, accompanied by visions, recurred frequently in the subsequent part of her life. They have since been adduced as Divine attentations of her saintship, but the sisterhood in the convent set them down to the possession by the devil... The visions grew more and more vivid. The cross of her rosary was snatched from her hand one day, and when returned, it was made of jewels more brilliant than diamonds, visible, however, to her alone. She often had an acute pain in the side, and fancied that an angel came to her with a lance tipped with fire, which he struck into her heart."

Under "John of the Cross", apart from the biographical data you find one single sentence: "The lofty symbolism of his prose is frequently obscure, but his lyrical verses are distinguished for their rapturous ecstasy, and beauty of expression." The Edition 1964 only shesses: "one of the great mystics of all time" and specifics in literary details of prosody.

(Ed. 1955): Lucie Christine (1844-1908) "also had visions of another description: she was shown hell with its horrors, and the devil would sit upon her breviary, belabour her with blows, and fill her cell with imps. For several years these experiences continued, and the verdict as to their source still remained far from unanimous."

Very few of the above assumed characteristics of mysticism can really stand a thorough scrutiny. Let us attempt one. We have to begin far back, if we want to get a solid base which permits seeing the threadbareness of the stale argumentation underlying the widespread prejudices about mysticism.

Although under the heading of mysticism sometimes are included those strange experiences which go by the name of thought-reading, telepathy, clairvoyance, clairaudition, bi-location and several more, the conception of nature-mysticism can be confined "to praeter-natural experiences in which sense perception and discursive thought are transcended in an immediate apperception of a unity which is apprehended as lying beyond and transcending the multiplicity of the world as we know it", following hereby an author who is well known to the English public, R. C. Zaehner (Spalding

Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at the University of Oxford), and whose outstanding work about mysticism¹ has to be considered as one of the most solid and profound studies in the relevant sciences.² The keynote of all natural mysticism is without doubt "union", though all praeternatural experience is very far from being essentially and always one and the same, otherwise the transports of the saint and the ecstasies of the maniac would be identical. This latter thesis is held by Aldous Huxley³ who claimed that what he experiences under the influence of the mescaline-drug could be closely compared to a genuine mystical experience and that the highest states of the mystics should be compared to, or even identified with, the effects of drugs and alcohol. In the last consequences all meditative and contemplative religion could be reduced to pure lunacy, in as much certain states usually referred to as mystical seem also characteristic of acute mania.

The natural mystical experience, whose essence is union and which may or may not be accompanied by any subsidiary and accidental praeternatural phenomenon, proves nothing at all in that direction, but simply indicates that there is in Nature sometimes a deeper and more intimate unity than is normally perceptible and that nature can be experienced as being mysteriously inside man himself who may experience the past in the present and imagine having transcended time and space. The dangerous and most fatal consequence of such an imagination may end in the phantom of being the Absolute or God Himself. In such a case a mystical experience, as a sense of union or even identity with something other than oneself, runs the risk of overriding the proper self, for, imagining that I am the Absolute Itself (Brahman, God), i.e. One without a second, I cannot any longer speak logically of being united to the Absolute, since in my imagination I am already the Absolute (Him or It) myself.

R. C. Zaehner, and we may concede that in doing so he is right, distinguishes three types of praeternatural experience:

a) The experience usually termed pantheistic which tells you that you are all and that all is you, culminating in the famous formula of the Kausitaki-Upanishad "Thou art this all". Yet it is wrong to call that experience of the nature mystic "pantheistic", because no term of it represents God or has any relation to God. Therefore, what is meant here is better represented by the term "*pan-en-hen-ism*", i.e. "all-in-one-ism".

¹ Cf. R. C. ZAEHNER, *Mysticism Sacred and Profane*, Oxford, 1957.

² Yet we differ from Zaehner's analysis in several instances as will be shown in the course of this exposition.

³ Cf. ALDOUS HUXLEY, *The Doors of Perception*, London, 1954.

b) The *Vedāntin monism* culminates in the Upanishad-formulae "Thou art that", "This ātman is Brahman" ("This individual soul is the Absolute"), "I am Brahman" and "Consciousness is Brahman", "Ātman" meaning "self", the individual soul. "The proposition then, that 'Ātman is Brahman' means that the individual soul is substantially and essentially identical with the unqualifiable Absolute. From this it follows that the phenomenal world has no true existence in itself: from the point of view of the Absolute it is absolutely non-existent. Therefore, the soul which realizes itself as the Absolute, must also realize the phenomenal world as non-existent. This, then, is to experience one's own soul as being the Absolute, and not to experience the phenomenal world at all."⁴

In both forms of natural mysticism any sense of communion with God and any direct apprehension of a Divine presence is entirely lacking.

c) The normal type of *Christian mystical experience* in which the soul apprehends and feels to be united with God in love. Mysticism here means a direct apprehension of the Deity, a direct relationship between the soul and God and above all union with Him. In Christian mysticism moreover the dogma of the love of God is put to the test, as Zaehner puts it.

Zaehner attempted to show that the *Hinduism* of the Upanishads is a bridge between nature mysticism (in its form the identification of the human soul with the whole of Nature) and conscious theistic mysticism.

But, if we accept the description of Brahman as "Being, Awareness or Thought, and Bliss", which, according to Zaehner, later became current among all the Vedāntin schools, "it is very plain that we are not here dealing with an élan vital, libido, or energy inhering in matter, but to all intents and purposes with a living and personal God."⁵ Moreover, "the Bhagavad-Gītā takes us a stage beyond monism in that it introduces a personal and incarnate God with whom a personal relation is possible."⁶ Whereas the state of the nature mystic in its pan-en-henic form is the realization of the oneness of Nature, in the classic technique of the Hindus an ascetic training is essential to any higher mystical state. But to subdue the passions and to empty one's being of all unessentials is not enough, if the essential soul is left at the mercy of whatever will take the place of them. Therefore, the Hindu theistic mystic philosopher Rāmānuja after having attacked Sankara and disputed the monistic position, knew quite well that first of all one has to set his will and mind firmly on the Absolute Being, i.e. God Himself who is all truth and Good-

⁴ Cf. R. C. ZAEHNER, *Mysticism Sacred and Profane*, pp. 28-29.

⁵ Cf. ZAEHNER, *l.c.*, p. 140.

⁶ Cf. ZAEHNER, *l.c.*, p. 146.

ness. It is, besides, of some interest that we find the Christian insight in God's anticipation, which elected us to love Him, intimated already in a saying of Abu Yazid (who introduced Indian monism into Islam and felt torn between his attachment to a transcendental God and to monism): "I thought that I loved Him, but when I looked (again I saw that) his love preceded mine". In theistic mysticism it is always God who takes the first step and makes the human soul fit for the union with Him.⁷

In a similar way it is the case with Sūfism: "They asked Junayd (who combatted pantheism and formulated the classical Sufidoctrine): "What is Sufism?" and he replied, "That you should be with God and free from attachment".⁸

The great Muslim mystic and theologian Ghazali, also battling pantheism, seemed to have followed Junayd more or less closely, when he started with the dogma that God alone exists in reality. He allows man's "borrower existence" to fall from him, in order that man be annihilated and God alone remains. For him the real mystic is completely overcome by the presence of God.⁹

Summarizing the characteristics essentials of the third form of mysticism Zaehner could state: "Mystical religion proper, then, shows that the mystical state at which the religious man aims, is the reverse of the natural mystical experience: it is the cutting off of one's ties with the world, the settling in quietness in one's own immortal soul, and finally the offering of that soul up to the Maker".¹⁰ In the eyes of the theistic mystic the monist's idea of "liberation" is simply the realization of his immortal soul in separation of God, and is only a stage in the path of the beginner (Junayd).¹¹

It is therefore of the utmost importance to avoid the, alas, often too popular confusion between nature mysticism and the theistic mysticism which lends countenance to the position that God is simply another term for Nature and is reduced to a sum-total of natural impulses.

Perhaps the opposition between the different aims of theistic and monistic mysticism is best comprehended by using an image: "In the one case you have a ray of light returning to its source, or the drop of water dissolving in wine; in the other you have the drop of water imagining itself to be the ocean because it has no experience of the ocean not can it adequately conceive what

⁷ Cf. R. C. ZAEHNER, *l.c.*, pp. 146-147.

⁸ Cf. *ib.*, p. 149.

⁹ Cf. *ib.*, p. 160.

¹⁰ Cf. *ib.*, p. 149.

¹¹ Cf. *ib.*, p. 204.

the word means"¹² (Hinduism too had, as Zaehner put it, its theists as well as its monists; and the Bhagavad-Gita as well as Rāmānuja, according to him, stand nearer St. John of the Cross than they do to Sankara).

Thus we see how precipitated and unfounded the conclusions about mysticism were, to which the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* jumped. It is contradictory to the essentials of mysticism and to the facts of historical mysticism to suppose that "the speculative utterances of mysticism are always more or less pantheistic in character". This could be true only with regard to a single form of mysticism (i.e. the monistic form) but is strictly wrong with regard to the two other main forms of mysticism, namely to the "pan-en-henistic" nature mysticism on the one hand, and to the theistic mysticism on the other hand. As to the latter it would be for the rest equally wrong to affirm "a species of transfusion or identification" and to reduce God, who should "cease to be an object", to a mere experience and to reduce religion to a mere "heart-religion", the "powerful solvent of definite dogmas", which mysticism erroneously is supposer to be.

It remains yet to correct the wrong impression concerning outstanding representatives of western mysticism which, supported by popular philosophy and encyclopaedian "statements" is offered to the credulous mass.

Though we considered Zaehner a highly esteemed companion, especially along the routes of the mysticism of Eastern Religions, we must part company with him when he affirms, that "*Meister Eckhart* . . . at times adopted a fully monistic position"¹³ and by so doing supports a widely spread erroneous interpretation of the greatest mystic, Germany ever had. We concede that it is not easy to fathom a number of obscure sayings of Meister Eckhart, clothing them sometimes in an almost shocking nomenclature of his own, which facilitated an obvious misinterpretation as soon as these terms are torn out of the whole context and dissected into its incoherent parts.

Otto Karrer, Alois Dempf¹⁴ and, last but not least, Theodor Steinbüchel¹⁵ paved the way for an unequivocal theistic interpretation of Meister Eckhart.

It is customary with anti-Christian scholars to interpret Meister Eckhart as a champion fighting for the modern myths of a self-developing God and the self-deification of man, whereas in reality Eckhart always embraced the purest theism.

To fully understand one of Eckhart's most misunderstood remarks: "If God

¹² Cf. R. C. ZAEHNER, I.c., p. 181.

¹³ Cf. R. C. ZAEHNER, I.c., p. 205.

¹⁴ Cf. ALOIS DEMPFE, *Metaphisik des mittelalters*, München-Berlin, 1930, pp. 135-137.

¹⁵ Cf. STEINBÜCHEL, THEODOR, *Mensch und Gott in Frömmigkeit und Ethos der deutschen Mystik*, Düsseldorf (Patmos-Verlag), 1952.

did not exist, I would not exist; if I did not exist, God would not exist", it is necessary to consider continuously that Eckhart had always in mind the man who lives eternally in God as God's real idea of man, so that without this idea of man, God never exists. On the other hand, one has to pay attention that I myself, being a human being, thought from eternity by God, never would exist, if God did not exist.¹⁶ Well, this sounds like purest theism, devoid of the slightest tinge of pantheism!

Whosoever affirms that Meister Eckhart "best characterized God as nothing" (of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* 1955) forgets that Eckhart can be understood only by paying attention to his dialectical thinking: *Deus est esse* and *Deus est nihil*: God is Being and God is Nothing. For Eckhart's *Esse* is nothing abstract, but most perfect and most living (*plenitudo esse*) *Deus est intelligere*, in as much, whatever God thinks, springs into being. This is idealism in its most perfect (not Neo-Kantian or Hegelian) sense and conceived in the direct line of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas: "*Universas creaturas non quia sunt ideo novit Deus, sed ideo sunt, quia novit*".¹⁷

Moreover, as soon as one takes additionally into consideration that Eckhart strictly embraced the "*analogia entis*", every shadow of pantheism vanishes; the proportion between likeness and unlikeness dominates the analogous essential relation between God and his creatures and hinders any fusion or amalgamation of the two. Finally, Eckhart could never have been pantheist, because he stuck to the Thomistic theory of the real difference between *esse* and *existere*, two principles constitutive for finite beings principles that coincide only in God. The negation in the formula "God is nothing" is only due to Meister Eckhart's tendency to keep from God away all finite, human and imperfect determinations and is, therefore, simultaneously the position of an absolute incomparability of the Divine Being with every other being. God is for Eckhart nothing in the way in which all other beings are. Therefore, the assertion "*Deus est nihil*" demands dialectically the assertion "*Deus est esse*", in-as-much as God exists in an incomparably higher sense from the point of view of the essential hierarchy, than all created things do. Eckhart speaks therefore of God's "*überwesende nihtheit*".¹⁸ In the same way one has dialectically to complete the formula "God is not good". He is not good in the way in which all finite things and beings are good, i.e. in the sense of created beings, because he excels all goodness in an infinite and incomparable degree.

Here again Meister Eckhart keeps in line with St. Augustine's "*Deus bonus*

¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 59.

¹⁷ Cf. ST. AUGUSTINE, *15 de Trinit.*, cap. 13 in med. and THOMAS AQUINAS, *Summa Theol.*, I qu. 14, a. 8.

¹⁸ Cf. Th. Steinbüchel, I.c., p. 110 ss.

sine bonitate". As to the assertion "God is all", it was likewise in Christian mysticism, as for example with St. Augustine, a custom to repeat it without any smack of pantheism.

Nor did Eckhart, when he taught "as soon as God was, he created the world" condescend to a pantheistic leaning or assert the world's eternity, but only wished to emphasize the eternity of God's creative act, though by his bold formulation he scandalized those who did not know how to distinguish clearly between the creative act and its effect in time.¹⁹

The essentials of Eckhart's mysticism are based on his living up to the maxim: "when thou hast God, thou hast with God the whole world; who has God and with Him the whole world, possesses not more than he who has God alone." The nothing in proportion to the universe is compared to the universe in proportion to God. Thus the universe is, as it were, a middle between God and the Nothing Eckhart meant the same what the Theresian "Dios solo basta" (God alone suffices) expresses. For him the union of the human soul with God is performed in the innermost bottom of the soul (*fünkelin*, *scintilla animae*, *hondón* in the Spanish mystics) by an act of intellectual intuition which is an immediate apprehension of the highest Being and Value "*in actu trepidantis aspectus*" (St. Augustine).²⁰

Into the bottom of the human soul God alone enters and makes a very deep joy pervade the whole being of man.

With reference to the importance of Eckhart's mysticism the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* has improved since its last edition: Whilst the edition of 1955 gives yet a rather pantheistic interpretation, the edition of 1964 clearly acknowledges Eckhart's theism and orthodoxy.

Edition 1955: "Eckhart goes on to declare that apart from the Divine existence there is nothing... In addition to this pantheistic leaning, the statement that at the same God engendered His Son, co-eternal and equal to Himself, He created the world, brought Eckhart's orthodoxy under suspicion".

As to the assertion that "in Eckhart the attitude of churchman and traditionalist is entirely abandonend" and "the doctrines... acquire a new sense in the system and often become only a mystical representation of speculative truth" it may suffice to hint at the historical fact that

¹⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 145-146.

²⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 198-199.

Meister Eckhart in his defence wrote the significant proposition: "Errare enim possum, haereticus esse non possum".²¹

Edition 1964: "His theology has close affinities with that of Thomas Aquinas, but there are differences of emphasis — Like Pseudo-Dionysius, Eckhart refers to God as "Nothing". This implies not that God does not exist, but that he has a fuller existence than any created being. If we are to affirm anything positive about God, the most important statement we can make is that he is (Ex. III, 14). With Aquinas, Eckhart adds that, whereas the creature has being, God is being. In a sense he is above being, since he created being.

When Eckhart asserts that all created beings are unum purum nihil, he does not deny the existence of the world, but means that in comparison with God the world is as nothing. His cardinal doctrine is that of the birth of the Son in the soul, which signifies the mystical union of the human and divine, the highest goal of man. This is attained by a process of purification. It is a union of wills, not of essences. It is given by grace, not acquired by merit."

But with reference to the importance of the mystical culmination in Spain represented by St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross we dare say that the Edition of 1964 fell equally short of the expectation set in it, in so far as whole paragraphs of the Edition 1955 were uncritically copied. The appreciation of John of the Cross lacks entirely of sound theological or philosophical expositions (Cf. in this paper p. 4).

*St. Theresa de Avila gave in her succinct treatise "Las Moradas" ("The Abodes") that goes by the name of "Castillo Interior" ("The Inner Castle") such a deep and well-weighed theory of the hierarchical steps of mystical amplification (which in part served as pattern for St. John of the Cross, the greatest systematic mystic Europe ever had), that it sounds like an insult without the slightest support to assert that the mysticism of St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross "consists simply in the heaping up of sensuous experiences", that "the speculation character has entirely faded out of it", and to confine the memorable data of that great feminine genius to the enumeration of a few superstitions and crazy tricks the devil should have been playing on her. It is difficult to understand how a standard work of high ranking such as the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* could have accepted such pseudo-scientific clichés.*

It is erroneous to lay the stress in explaining mysticism upon ecstatic expe-

²¹ Cf. *Th. Steinbüchel*, 1.c., p. 20.

riences which have never constituted the essentials of mysticism and which are to be judged as mere accessories or may even be missing all together. The three forms of Theresian ecstasies ("arrobamiento", "arreatamiento" and "vuelo de espíritu" or "rapto") have only a preparatory character and are lacking on the highest step of mysticism i.e. in the seventh "morada". This "morada" is without ecstasis and represents the most intimate union with God.

St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross make a careful distinction between spirit and soul. "Hay diferencia en alguna manera, y muy conocida del alma al espíritu, aunque más sea todo uno" ("There is in a certain way a well known distinction between soul and spirit, though all is more one") ("Las Moradas", VII, 1). The Aristotelian distinction between the first and the second actualization of the soul is here recalled. In a similar way St. Thomas Aquinas called spirit the soul in-as-much it can be independent from the body, whereas by the soul in its proper sense he meant the body's vital principle. Besides, this distinction is of great importance to delimit the "meditación" as an activity of the sensuous soul from the "contemplación" as an activity of the spiritual soul.²²

The mysticism of St. Theresa and St. John of the Cross is born out of a deep humility, i.e. "Dios es suma verdad, y la humildad es andar en verdad" ("God is the highest truth and humility is walking in truth") ("Las Moradas", VI, 10), and out of a deep love, i.e. "Querría tener mil vidas para emplearlas todas en Dios" ("I should like to have thousands lives and to employ them all for God") ("Las Moradas", VI, 4). It keeps very far from a passive indolence and a dreamy revelling: "Que no, hermanas, no: obras quiere el Señor" ("No, my sisters, no: our Lord wants works!") ("Las Moradas", V, 3). Deeds and works are born out of the "divine matrimony" — the highest "morada" of Theresian mysticism. On the one side, God and the soul enjoy each other in the most intimate silence: "en esta Morada suya, sólo El y el alma se gozan, con grandísimo silencio" ("Las Moradas", VII, 3), whereas on the other side, this spiritual matrimony serves to bring forth out of it always works and works: "de esto sirve este matrimonio espiritual, de que nazcan siempre obras, obras" ("Las Moradas", VII, 4).

It is impossible to appreciate in a few lines the gigantic systematic work of *St. John of the Cross*, who is presented to the public only as author of "lyrical verses distinguished for their rapturous ecstasy and beauty of expres-

²² Cf. ALOYS MAGER, *Mystik als Lehre und Leben*, 1934, and *Mystik als seelische Wirklichkeit*, 1945, passim, and Ivo Höllhuber, *gentliche der Philosophie in Spanischen Kulturbein*, Munich-Bäle, 1967, p. 52-97 and p. 226.

sion" and of "a frequently obscure prose (full of) lofty symbolism". Not even the most important achievements of that pioneer of theoretical mysticism that he actually was to a degree never excelled in later centuries, can be here sketched.

En una noche oscura	In a dark night
Con ansias en amores inflamada,	The soul inflamed
¡Oh dichosa ventura!	With deep love's yearnings
Salí sin ser notada	O felicitous venture!
Estando ya mi casa sosegada.	I set out
	when my house was already
	calmed down.
	(that means, when all
	sensuous appetites were
	calmed and lulled to sleep)

For three reasons St. John called that narrow way that leads to the union with God a "dark night" in his "Subida del Monte Carmelo" and in his "Noche Oscura": *first*, in regard to the start by which the soul sets out, because man has to lack the appetites of all things he possessed in the world and negate them; that negation is night to all of his senses; *secondly*, in regard to the means and to the path the soul must take in order to reach divine union; that way is Faith which is another night to human understanding "*in statu viatoris*"; and *thirdly*, in regard to the end he has to attain i.e. God, who in the life beneath is a dark night too for the yearning soul.

The purgations, which man's soul has to undergo, when passing the dark night of the senses and the even more tremendous night of the spirit, are of an active character as long as the soul is kept busy with its ascetic work, and of a passive character in the moment, God Himself acts in the soul as principal agent so that the soul's acting is God's own acting.

Though St. John of the Cross in his most tender mystical work "Llama de Amor Viva" ("The vivid Flame of Love"), I, 12, concedes that "El centro del alma es Dios" ("the centre of the soul is God"), there is no room left for any form of pantheism, because the soul is God only in the sense that it is God by participation: "y la sustancia de esta alma, aunque no es sustancia de Dios, porque no puede sustancialmente convertirse en él, pero estando unida como aquí esté con él y absorba en él *es Dios por participación de Dios*" ("Llama de Amor Viva", II, 34), "and the substance of that soul, though it is not substance of God, because it cannot change into Him, remains here united with Him and absorbed in Him, and is God by participation of God".

In that highest grade of union, the soul "acts in God through God that what He acts in the soul through Himself, in the way that He acts it, *because the will of the two are one and so the operation of God and the operation of the soul are one*" ("Llama de Amor Viva", III, 78: "hace ella en Dios por Dios lo que él hace en ella por sí mismo, al modo que él lo hace, *porque la voluntad de los dos es una, y así la operación de Dios y de ella es una*").

In the mysticism of St. John of the Cross Love prevails as it does in every genuine Christian mysticism:

Ni ya tengo otro oficio	I have no other office
Que ya sólo en amar es mi ejercicio	For loving is alone all
("Cántico Espiritual", c.XXVIII)	my occupation.

The theoretical mysticism of St. John of the Cross culminates therefore in Love as its highest imaginable form: *Love on the side of God* who says in that most intimate union to the jubilant soul: "Yo soy tuyo y para tí, y gusto, de ser tal cual soy para ser tuyo y para darme a tí", ("Llama de Amor Viva", III, 6: "I am thine and for thee and I enjoy to be such as I am in order to be thine and to give me to thee"); and *Love on the side of man* who, although realizing in his humility the immense distance between the creature and its Maker, enjoys an ineffable bliss, because he becomes able to give to God a return present of inestimable value i.e. to give to God, God Himself in God: "está dando a Dios al mismo Dios en Dios" ("Llama de Amor Viva", III, 78).

In this context a word of caution must be said about the general prejudices regarding mysticism as a whole. If the aim and purpose of genuine mysticism is an immediate apprehension of an intuitional intelligence, avoiding the discursive thought, one wonders why so often even competent scientists succumbed to the temptation of bringing mysticism in antithesis to reason, in antithesis to theism in general and to Christian Revelation in particular, and in antithesis to activity in daily life.²³

That *mysticism is not opposed to reason* follows already from the fact that even in common life and thought a non-rational knowledge is the foundation of all our rational knowledge, of all propositions and of all conceptions. The stress might be laid upon the intelligence (in the sense of an "intuslegere") which in the intuition of the idea of *esse*, i.e. of the first truth of an Objective Interiority that has nothing to do with subjectivism.

²³ Cf. e.g. the disapproval of mysticism in W. HERRMANN: *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*, 6th ed., Stuttgart-Berlin, 1908, p. 23 ss. and F. GOGARTEN; *Die religiöse Entscheidung*, Jena, 1921, p. 37.

That mysticism is *not opposed to theism* we hope to have made sufficiently clear by showing that even in oriental mysticism a whole trend of mystical thinking and feeling, embraced a theistic philosophy as its fully acknowledged background and base. Yet a few words have to be added with regard to the relation of mysticism with Christian theology. By studying especially the earlier centuries of Christian thought and life one is forced to conclude that mysticism is nothing extraordinary, but only the normal culmination of perfectly living up to the Christian ideals. Mystical life may thus be regarded as the manhood of a mature inner life so that whosoever did not yet taste mystical life (which, as was explained, can very well miss all ecstasies as unnecessary accessories), has not yet stripped off the shoes of spiritual infancy. For, in the development of normal spiritual life, the purification of the soul is not complete, if it has not yet experienced the "passive" purifications which have always a mystical character.²⁴ Nor is from the theological point of view a special appointment to mystical life necessary, it presupposes only a pure heart, a simplicity of spirit, a great humility, a great concentration in thought and prayer, and an ardent love. "Who can say", exclaims *Garrigou Lagrange*,²⁵ "these inner presuppositions exceed my forces and exceed the bestowed graces?" Consequently in the early Christian centuries *mysticism* was wide spread and quite generally acknowledged, although the *normal* culmination of having perfectly lived up to Christian ideals remained nevertheless always a *culmination-point*.

Only by slow degrees, mysticism receded to become a rare event, a fact which *Aloys Mager* called special attention to.²⁶ One of the chief reasons of the decline of mystical life even among the best, seems to be the lack of genuine humility and the rarity of perfect co-incidence of one's proper will with the Divine Will and a rather stubborn living up to one's own extremely subjective and egoistical ideas of perfection.

That mysticism is *not opposed to the activity of daily life*, is sufficiently proved by the biographies of the great mystics who generally led a most active life, and that life *not next to, but resulting from their* contemplative life, owing all the excessive forces, necessary for their practical life, to their

²⁴ Cf. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, *Perfection chrétienne et contemplation*, Paris, 1923, p. 442: "Dans le progrès de la vie intérieure, la purification de l'âme n'est complète que par les purifications passives, qui sont d'ordre mystique".

²⁵ Cf. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, *l.c.*, p. 484, and Ivo Höllhuber, *geschichte der Philosophie un spanischen Kultubeinich*, 1967, p. 55 ss.

²⁶ Cf. ALOYS MAGER, *Mystik als Lehre und Leben*, 1934, passim, and likewise to Kus whole chapter. Ivo Höllhuber, *Sprache-Gesellschaft-Mystik*, Munich/Bäle, 1963, pp. 263-331.

mystical experience. It may suffice to remember that for example St. Theresa of Avila, one of whose devices was "obras, obras y no palabras!" (works, works and no words!), gained out of her "spiritual matrimony" sufficient forces to display during twenty years an indefatigable activity in performing wide-reaching reforms and in founding a considerable number of convents; St. John of the Cross excelled in a similar way, both in mystical contemplation and in an active life of a convent's prior. In agreement with his own rigorous demands, he sought for himself not the easier, but the more difficult modes of living: "Procure siempre inclinarse no a lo más fácil sino a lo más dificultoso... no a lo más gustoso, sino antes a lo que da menos gusto... no a lo que es descanso sino a lo trabajoso... ("Subida del Monte Carmelo", I, cap. XIII, 6) ("Try to bow theeself always not to the easier, but to the more difficult; not to the more agreeable, but to the less agreeable; not to what grants repose, but to what is troublesome").

BOSQUEJO DE UNA TEORÍA DE LA MEDIACIÓN LÓGICA

SERGIO SARTI
Udine, Italia.

ESTOY PERSUADIDO DE que entre lógica y ontología subsisten estrechas relaciones, y que no tomarlas en cuenta no favorezca ni a una ni a la otra. El lector no se sorprenda por lo tanto si en el trazar el bosquejo de una teoría de la mediación lógica tomo las instancias de un argumento que aparece muy lejano del ámbito de la lógica, esto es de la ecología.

De ecología se habla mucho hoy, desde que nos dimos cuenta que el difundirse de la tecnología amenaza de un modo gravísimo el equilibrio vital de nuestro planeta, y poniendo en un "tal" vez nuestra misma supervivencia.¹ No obstante me parece que la filosofía no haya extraído generalmente lecciones útiles de este hecho. El único argumento, en lo que sé, ha sido recabado de la precaria situación determinada por el desarrollo indiscriminado de la tecnología, tiene un sabor más político que filosófico; se ha observado que esto afecta a la ideología marxista, ya sea porque ésta pone en la culminación de la dialéctica histórica una sociedad que liberada de toda opresión debería dedicarse a "vencer la naturaleza" (y los hechos nos demuestran que precisamente esta "victoria" sobre la naturaleza significa, o puede significar, el fin del hombre y por lo tanto de toda sociedad); sea porque la polución en sus varias y múltiples formas afecta tanto a capitalistas y proletarios, y es consecuencia de las industrias en cuanto tales, sea cual sea la ideología que está detrás de las fábricas, de las máquinas, y de sus procesos técnicos.²

¹ Entre las diversas obras que tratan de los peligros del "cientificismo y de la tecnología" cuando son ejercidos en forma indiscriminada, me gusta citar a SERMONTI, Giuseppe, *El crepúsculo del científicismo*, Milán, Rusconi Editor, 1971. El Sermonti, eminente estudioso de genética, es de los pocos científicos que no ceden a las seducciones del triunfalismo científico y que tienen presentes todos sus lados negativos. En su trabajo, el lector podrá encontrar citadas otras publicaciones competentes sobre el argumento.

² La observación ha sido hecha, entre otros, también por BARBIELLINI-AMIDEL, Gas-